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A B S T R A C T
This paper assesses the proposal to transform the monetary system into an Ecology of money, that is, into a
system made of a large diversity of complementary currencies. Its central aim is to examine whether this pro-
posal could provide a systemic solution to both the ecological and financial crises, as several authors, most
notably Lietaer and Douthwaite, have argued. To this end, it analyses the two main arguments in favour of this
proposal. First, it focuses on the claim that an Ecology of money would be more resilient and less prone to crisis
than the present monetary system. It shows that this argument suffers from several conceptual flaws and argues
that it fails to provide sufficient normative reasons to favour an Ecology of money. Second, this paper analyses
the claim that an Ecology of money could help defeat the monetary growth imperative that supposedly plagues
our economies. The paper raises serious doubts about the existence of such an imperative and questions the
claim that an Ecology of money could contribute to weaken it in a significant way.
1. Introduction
The last decade has seen the world increasingly hit by two damaging
crises. First, there is now large empirical evidence that the ecological
crisis is affecting every part of the world (Rockström et al., 2009;
Steffen et al., 2015). The world has also suffered from a dramatic fi-
nancial and monetary crisis, which spread all over the world and ex-
posed the fragilities of governments' finance and the incapacities of
state authorities to handle monetary policy and banking supervision in
an efficient way (Pettifor, 2017; Turner, 2016). A growing literature in
ecological economics is attempting to bridge the gap between these
ecological and economic challenges. Several authors have for long
warned that constant economic growth is leading to the depletion of
natural resources and is putting an excessive strain on environmental
sustainability (Daly, 1990; Georgescu-Roegen, 1974; Jackson, 2016).
More recent attempts focus on building up ecological macroeconomic
models that can account for these phenomena (Fontana and Sawyer,
2016; Rezai and Stagl, 2016; Victor, 2008). Part of the literature is also
concerned with finding ways to weaken the strain of economic devel-
opment on natural ecosystems: some argue for sustainable growth
(Solow, 1993; Stiglitz, 1997) while others reject that concept altogether
and defend de-growth or a stationary state instead (Martínez-Alier
et al., 2010).
This paper contributes to this latter part of the literature by ana-
lysing one proposal that, according to its proponents, could provide a
systemic solution to both the ecological and financial crises. This pro-
posal has been called the “Ecology of money”, following the work of
Douthwaite (2000, 2012), and of Lietaer et al. (2009, 2010, 2012).1
Their core idea is that one of the root causes of both crises lies in a lack
of monetary plurality and that one key solution to these crises would be
to implement an “Ecology of money”. They argue that the monetary
system should be transformed so as to induce a large diversity of actors
(banks, states, citizens, …), within each monetary area, to create mul-
tiple complementary currencies. These could span from local, regional
and national currencies to Local Exchange Trading Systems, Barter
systems and small-scale social currencies (Douthwaite, 2000, chap. 5;
Lietaer et al., 2012).
This proposal is part of a recent trend that analyses how new forms
of money could contribute to tackle environmental challenges. Several
authors have stressed that small-scale complementary currency
schemes could have several potential benefits for sustainability (Brooks,
2015; Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013) or for social cohesion
(Guéorguieva-Bringuier and Ottaviani, 2018; Oliver Sanz, 2016), even
though recent empirical research found no significant empirical evi-
dence of such effects (Marshall and O'Neill, 2018; Michel and Hudon,
2015). Lietaer's and Douthwaite's proposal is more radical and aims at
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the large-scale adoption of complementary currencies. It has become a
standard focal point in discussions around the desirability of com-
plementary currencies (Attout et al., 2013; Dron, 2015; Joachain and
Klopfert, 2012). However, there is, to my knowledge, no academic
discussion of that proposal. The academic literature on monetary
plurality focuses either on the history of past episodes of plurality
(Fantacci, 2005; Kuroda, 2008), or on the study of present small-scale
experiments (Blanc, 2018; Gómez, 2018). This paper is an attempt to
fill this gap. It examines the link between monetary plurality and sus-
tainability in a systematic way, and inquires whether having a plurality
of currencies circulating in parallel to each other is necessary for
creating a stable and sustainable human society. To this end, the paper
analyses thoroughly the main arguments that Douthwaite and Lietaer
and his co-authors have put forward in favour of their proposal.
Section 2 focuses on their first main argument. Citing the work of
Fisher (1935) and Minsky (1986), both authors argue that the current
monetary system has an inherent tendency to instability, as bank
money tends to be too abundant in times of booms and too scarce in
times of crisis (Douthwaite, 2000, chap. 1, 2012, p. 192; Lietaer et al.,
2012, pp. 94–95). They claim that, similarly to natural ecosystems, a
more diverse monetary system would be more resilient to economic and
financial shocks, and, therefore, more stable. Section 3 examines their
second main argument. Lietaer and Douthwaite argue that a more di-
verse monetary system would contribute to weakening the so-called
monetary “growth imperative” that allegedly plagues our economies
(Douthwaite, 2000, chap. 1; Lietaer et al., 2012, chap. 5). Presently, the
greatest part of the money supply is made of the sum of all credits
issued by private banks (McLeay et al., 2014). Alongside Douthwaite
and Lietaer, a growing number of researchers is claiming that this
credit-based creation process triggers a growth spiral (Farley et al.,
2013; Kuzminski, 2013; Loehr, 2012), though critics argue that this
growth imperative is much exaggerated or even non-existent (Richters
and Siemoneit, 2019; Strunz et al., 2017). Lietaer and Douthwaite argue
that implementing an Ecology of money would slowly weaken that
growth imperative by gradually replacing bank money by interest-free
complementary currencies. In addition, Douthwaite also advocates the
creation of a single “energy-backed” currency, to which every currency
belonging to the Ecology of money would be connected. Its creation
would be limited by the availability of CO2 emission permits, so as to
reduce environmental degradation and discourage growth (Douthwaite,
2000, chap. 5).
Alongside these two central arguments, Lietaer and Douthwaite
raise several other complaints against bank money. Lietaer, in parti-
cular, argues that it threatens social cohesion, increases wealth in-
equalities and fails to take future outcomes properly into account
(Lietaer et al., 2012, pp. 103–114). However, these worries are less
central to their argument and do not necessarily relate to a lack of
monetary diversity. Many complementary currencies, such as some
government-sponsored currencies and most private currencies, do not
give users or participants a say in the decision-making process (Blanc,
2018). Moreover, the impact on wealth inequality or social cohesion of
complementary currencies is far from obvious (Marshall and O'Neill,
2018; Michel and Hudon, 2015). I leave these points aside, as we may
have doubts that an Ecology of money would help solving these issues.
Section 4 summarizes the main findings of the paper. On the one
hand, this article argues that the analogy between monetary and eco-
logical ecosystems is far from evident and fails to provide sufficient
normative reasons to favour an Ecology of money. On the other hand,
we may question whether getting rid of the monetary growth im-
perative necessarily requires implementing an Ecology of money.
2. Ecology of Money and Stability
2.1. Presentation of the Argument
According to classical definitions, such as Tobin's (2008), a currency
is a medium of exchange with a unique denomination, that relates to a
unique standard of value, but which might take several forms as a
means of payment (notes, coins, etc.). For instance, the euro, the dollar
and the Bristol pound are all examples of currencies: even if they may
take various forms as means of payment, they have a unique denomi-
nation and the value of one unit of these currencies is the same for any
unit at a given moment in time.
Under Lietaer's scheme, the present monetary system would be
complemented by a myriad of parallel currencies (Lietaer et al., 2009,
pp. 10–12). These include Local currencies, which circulate within a
confined geographic area, and Local Exchange Trading System (LETS),
a type of mutual credit system. It also includes complex projects, in-
volving both civil society and governments. The NU-project in the
Netherlands, the WIR in Switzerland, or the French SOL belong to this
latter category. Finally, Lietaer's Ecology of money would also involve
commercial currencies, such as Air Miles. According to that scheme,
any actor (businesses, towns and local communities, as well as states,
regions and municipalities) would be free to create its own currency
(for a more exhaustive review, see Lietaer et al., 2012, chaps. 7–8).
Douthwaite defines his own version of an Ecology of money as
consisting of a large array of currencies, organized in a structured way
(Douthwaite, 2000, chap. 4). At the top, there would be an interna-
tional currency functioning like a modern Gold standard (with Gold
replaced by CO2 emission rights). This would be complemented by
national, regional and local currencies, as well as by “store-of-value”
currencies, for those economic agents who would wish to have a safe
haven for their wealth. Douthwaite imagines a complex set of exchange
mechanisms to manage this large diversity of currencies. Douthwaite's
proposal has one key difference with Lietaer's proposal: the existence, at
the top of the monetary pyramid, of an “energy-backed” currency.
Douthwaite argues that tying money creation to a scarce resource may
restrain economic growth. This difference has no consequence on the
present argument. However, as we shall see in section 3, it does have
some implications for the growth imperative argument.
Both authors contend that an Ecology of money would make our
current monetary system more stable and less prone to crisis
(Douthwaite, 2000; Lietaer et al., 2012). Douthwaite argues – without
reference to the economic literature on the subject, though – that the
present economic system is inherently unstable: excessive amounts of
money are created in times of booms, and too little in times of recession
(Douthwaite, 2000, chap. 1). He then argues that his Ecology of money
would be less prone to crisis than conventional monetary systems
(Douthwaite, 2000, chap. 4). According to his argument, regional and
local currencies can be viewed as fall-back mechanisms in times of
crisis. He takes the example of Britain's economic disparities in the
1980's, when London was booming while Manchester was in recession.
Though Douthwaite says nothing about the cause of these economic
disparities, he argues that having regional currencies in parallel to the
Sterling Pound would have allowed to stabilize Britain's economy, by
giving the opportunity to Manchester's authorities to create the ap-
propriate amount of money (Douthwaite, 2012, pp. 191–192).
Lietaer and his co-authors have developed this argument in much
greater detail, and I therefore mainly focus on their version of the ar-
gument in the remaining of this section. They share Douthwaite's view
that our economic system is unstable, and plagued by constant “booms”
and “busts”. They take this to be an obvious fact, supported empirically
and in theory by the work of Minsky (1986), Fisher (1935) and others
(see Lietaer et al., 2012, p. 95 for more references), though they do not
discuss the connection between their argument and the diverse theories
of these authors. They then argue that their proposal would make our
current monetary system more stable through a right balance of effi-
ciency and resilience. According to Lietaer et al. (2009), these concepts
find their origin in scientific ecology, namely in the works of May
(1972) and of Holling (1973). However, their interpretation of these
concepts is rather superficial, and does not clearly relate to the works of
these authors. According to Lietaer et al. (2012, p. 78) efficiency, or
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throughput efficiency, “measures the ability of a system to process
volumes of the relevant matter-flow, energy-flow and/or information-
flow”. They supposedly borrowed this concept from May (1972),
though May himself does not mention it. Resilience, on the other hand,
“measures the ability of a system to recover from a disturbance” (see
also Goerner et al., 2009, p. 77). According to Lietaer and his co-au-
thors, that concept is inspired by the work of Holling (1973). However,
what they call “resilience” does not correspond strictly to Holling's own
definition, and may rather relate to his concept of “stability”, which
indicates “the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a
temporary disturbance” (Holling, 1973, p. 14). For Holling, resilience
points to another concept, namely, “the measure of the persistence of
systems and of their ability to absorb change” (Holling, 1973, p. 14).
Lietaer's argument is that stability is attained when the optimal
balance between efficiency and resilience prevails (Lietaer et al., 2012,
p. 79). The key parameter connecting them is “diversity”. On the one
hand, increased diversity enhances resilience “because there are nu-
merous channels of interaction to fall back in times of trouble” (Lietaer
et al., 2012, p. 78; see also Douthwaite, 2012, pp. 191–192). On the
other hand, efficiency tends to decrease with diversity. A more diverse
system may become more complex to engineer and, therefore, less ef-
ficient. In short, they argue that there is a trade-off between resilience
and efficiency: the more a system is resilient, the less it is efficient, and
vice-versa. Unfortunately, Lietaer and his co-authors do not specify
precisely when optimality is achieved, and do not provide a precise
criterion to measure how resilient, efficient or stable a given system
might be. Conceptual vagueness may sometimes be fruitful, especially
for interdisciplinary communication (Strunz, 2012, p. 115). However,
as we shall see in the next sections, it also poses several problems re-
garding both the empirical evaluation and the normative relevance of a
theory (Strunz, 2012, p. 114).
Lietaer et al. (2009, 2010, 2012) argue that natural ecosystems that
are more diverse are also more stable and resilient: the diversity of their
constituent elements allow them to attain the optimal balance of resi-
lience and efficiency. By analogy, they conclude that only monetary
plurality can provide the optimal balance of resilience and efficiency. A
larger diversity of currencies could provide a larger array of tools for
effectively responding to shocks in times of crisis. And an Ecology of
money would be better able to respond to turmoil because reliable
currencies would replace defective ones in times of crisis. Moreover,
they share Douthwaite's intuition that such a system would be less
likely to be hit by a financial or monetary crisis, because it would be
less dependent on one single currency.
Before analysing Lietaer's argument in detail, let me stress why it
makes sense to phrase it as an analogical argument. Lietaer and his co-
authors are ambiguous on this regard. On the one hand, they write that
“[our argument] is relevant for any network of a similar structure,
therefore the applicability to an economic network is not simply an
analogy, but a direct application of the theoretical framework described
above” (Lietaer et al., 2009, p. 9). On the other hand, their writings are
pervaded by analogies between natural and economic systems. Actu-
ally, the sentence just before the one quoted above uses an analogy: “In
this view, money is to the real economy like blood is to your body: it is
an essential vehicle for catalyzing processes, allocating resources, and
generally allowing the exchange system to work as a synergetic whole.”
(Lietaer et al., 2009, p. 9). In the same paper (p.7), they write: “Plants
capture the sun's energy with photosynthesis; animals eat the plants;
species then eat each another in a chain to top predator (…). Similarly,
economies are circulation networks consisting of millions of businesses
and billions of customers (…).” Later, they conclude that “nature has
over billions of years selected the conditions under which complex
ecosystems are sustainable (…).We know that the theoretical frame-
work applies to both natural and man-made complex systems. Has the
time not come to learn in this domain from nature?” (p.10). These are
clear examples of arguments by analogy (Bartha, 2016). Lietaer cites
similarities between the two systems (i.e. their diversity) and then
concludes that some further similarity exists (i.e. their resilience and
stability).
Apart from these many examples of analogical reasoning, one
should note that the concepts they are using are borrowed and adapted
from scientific ecology, and then applied to economic systems (see
above). Moreover, most of the support that they might get for their
claims comes from scientific ecology. Therefore, it makes sense to ap-
peal to an analogical argument in order to strengthen and then criticize
their argument.
2.2. Logical Validity
Let us take Lietaer's argument as a starting point. Is this argument
valid? Does the analogy between natural and monetary ecosystems
make sense? What are its strengths and its weaknesses?
Philosophers of science have sought to establish criteria to evaluate
the strength of analogical arguments (for a review, see Woods et al.,
2000). I will use the framework of Hesse (1967), as presented in Bartha
(2016), who emphasizes three prerequisites for a good analogical ar-
gument. First, the analogy must concern observable similarities.
Second, the explained relation must be causal. Third, the compared
elements must not have “essential” differences. What counts as “es-
sential” is open to debates (see Bartha, 2016). On the one hand, the
compared elements should of course not be identical, otherwise it
would make no sense to compare them. On the other hand, for com-
parison to make any sense, these elements should have some key
properties in common. In our case, we will have to find out what
monetary and natural ecosystems may have in common.
2.2.1. Observable Similarities
Does Lietaer's argument, as presented in the previous section, re-
spect the first condition? The diversity, resilience and stability of nat-
ural ecosystems are observable properties and there is a large literature
in ecology on the subject (e.g. Zommers and Alverson, 2018). Similarly,
one can assess the stability of existing monetary systems and study how
they react and recover from shocks (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Haldane and
May, 2011). However, the resilience and stability of monetary systems
that would respect Lietaer's proposal is harder to observe. On the one
hand, as we have seen in the previous section, Lietaer and his-co-au-
thors do not provide a clear criterion that would allow to assess whe-
ther a system is resilient or efficient. However, even assuming that one
has a suitable concept of resilience or efficiency, a further problem is
that their proposal has not been applied on a large scale yet. If it was
implemented, one could of course observe how a diverse monetary
system would work, and whether it is resilient and stable. However,
nothing close to such a system has yet seen the light, even if past ex-
periments of monetary plurality are well-documented. Fantacci (2005),
Gómez (2018) and Kuroda (2008), among other authors, have studied
in depth examples of successful instances of monetary plurality. How-
ever, these authors do not attempt to justify these experiments, nor do
they argue for a modern implementation of similar ideas. Moreover, the
examples they study are not discussed by Lietaer, and do not necessarily
relate to his proposal.
In support of their ideas, Lietaer and his co-authors rather refer to
the WIR, which, according to them, provides a suitable illustration of
their proposal. The WIR is a Swiss complementary currency that is
deemed to have contributed to Swiss economic stability (Stodder, 2009;
Vallet, 2016). Lietaer et al. (2009, p. 1) even claim that “formal
econometric analysis has proven that the WIR acts as a significant
counter-cyclical stabilizing factor that explains the proverbial long-
standing stability of the Swiss economy.”
One could ask, first, whether the WIR does really provide an illus-
tration of what an Ecology of money might look like. The WIR is a
complementary currency, which small and medium enterprises (SME's)
can use to exchange goods and services (in Switzerland). WIR assets are
generated by credits from the WIR Bank. As Stodder (2009, pp. 80–81)
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explains, exchanges in WIR take the form of trade credit: when an ex-
change in WIR takes place, the account of the firm that sells a good is
credited of a given amount while the account of the buyer is debited of
the same amount. The WIR circulates along the Swiss Franc, but is not
redeemable in Swiss Franc. However, both Lietaer and Douthwaite
make clear that their proposal would involve a large array of different
currencies – not only two. The example of the WIR is thus far from an
ideal illustration of their proposal.
Second, if we nevertheless assume that it does provide an appro-
priate real-world illustration of their proposal, one can still wonder
whether it supports Lietaer's claim that diversity increases resilience.
Does Lietaer's theory really explain the WIR success? Stodder (2009)
and Vallet (2016) argue that the WIR has had a counter-cyclical effect
in times of crisis, especially for small and medium enterprises. In tur-
bulent times, members of the WIR tend to compensate for the loss in
sales in CHF by a rise in sales in WIR. However, contrary to what Lietaer
et al. (2009) claim, they do not go as far as saying that the existence of
the WIR explains overall Swiss stability. Stodder (2009) makes clear
that, while he found a statistically significant counter-cyclical effect of
the WIR on the Swiss economy, that effect is rather small and does not
constitute the main explaining factor of Swiss stability (see also Blanc,
2018, p. 99).
The existence of “fall-back” currencies may indeed constitute a va-
luable mechanism for economic stability. There is thus a case to be
made for currencies that, like the WIR, may contribute to stabilizing the
economy. However, we may have doubts that the WIR experiment may
be replicated elsewhere. Attempts to create similar currencies in
Belgium (RES) or in Sardinia (Sardex) have not achieved any significant
effects (Blanc, 2018). This may be explained, in part, by the WIR's
particular traits. Stodder (2009) stresses the importance of the WIR's
inherent characteristics (its solidity as a mutual trade credit scheme,
mainly). Vallet (2016), who has conducted interviews among the WIR
community, concludes that mutual trust and a spirit of cooperation
among WIR participants explain the WIR's success. Moreover, the WIR
is still extremely marginal compared to the Swiss Franc and it remains
to be seen whether scaling it up would be possible (Stodder, 2009).
Further research needs to be done in that area. In particular, more
quantitative studies would be required to show how the WIR has con-
tributed to Swiss' macroeconomic stability.
Therefore, despite its many virtues, the WIR is unlikely to provide
an illustration and an argument in favour of Lietaer's proposal. On the
one hand, the interactions between the WIR and the Swiss Franc are still
very far from what Lietaer has called an Ecology of money. On the other
hand, the factors explaining the WIR success do not relate to Lietaer's
claim that diversity leads to resilience. Stodder (2009) and Vallet
(2016), who have conducted the most in-depth studies of this currency,
both emphasize the role of the WIR's inherent traits in explaining its
success but do not mention diversity or resilience as explaining factors
of the WIR's effect on stability.
2.2.2. Causal Relations
The second requirement is that the analogy should concern causal
relations. Lietaer claims that there is a causal link between the diversity
and resilience of natural ecosystems, and between their resilience and
their stability. Increased diversity leads to increased resilience, which in
turn ensures greater stability. Using an analogical argument, he con-
tends that a monetary system consisting of a large diversity of curren-
cies will increase resilience and converge towards something similar to
a stable natural ecosystem.
In ecology, an immense literature studies the relationship between
diversity and stability. In their review article, Ives and Carpenter (2007)
show that most empirical studies confirm the expectation of a positive
relationship between diversity and stability (but not all). However,
these studies use numerous different concepts of stability, and none of
these definitions refers to the optimal balance of resilience and effi-
ciency (which is Lietaer's definition). In fact, as we have seen in section
2.1, the definition used in Lietaer et al. (2009, 2012) lacks support in
ecology and relies on a superficial interpretation of Holling's work
(1973). It may, therefore, be hard to assess whether that literature
supports Lietaer's claims.
Moreover, Ives and Carpenter (2007) show that there exist nu-
merous possible theoretical explanations of this phenomenon, which
often contradict each other. Their key point is that there is, for now, no
generally accepted theory of the diversity-stability relationship (Ives
and Carpenter, 2007, p. 61). Among potential theoretical explanations,
some do predict that diversity leads to stability through increased re-
silience, but not all. The authors do stress that some empirical studies
show that, when species respond differently to environmental shocks,
increasing diversity often makes the system more resilient and, there-
fore, more stable, because a decrease in population for some species is
counterbalanced by an increase in population for others. However,
there exist several counter-examples, such as instances of resilient but
unstable ecosystems. Holling, for instance, shows that, in some parts of
Canada experiencing extreme climatic conditions, insect populations
fluctuate constantly and widely, without returning to an equilibrium
state after disturbance. However, they are perfectly able to react to
climate shocks. Holling concludes that they are thus resilient but un-
stable (Holling, 1973, pp. 17–18). Finally, several theoretical explana-
tions of the positive relationship between diversity and stability do not
rest on resilience. The explaining factor can also be resistance to shocks,
the effects of competition between species, or relative isolation (Ives
and Carpenter, 2007).
In short, one can have doubts that Lietaer's interpretation of the
relationship between diversity and stability in ecology is the right one.
There is a relative consensus in ecology about the positive relationship
between diversity and stability. However, Lietaer's concept of stability
does not relate to any of those that are used in the mainstream literature
in ecology. Moreover, the relationship might be explained by a causal
mechanism that is different from Lietaer's, without any mention of re-
silience.
2.2.3. Non-Essential Differences
Recall that the third requirement for a “good” analogical argument
is that the compared elements must not have “essential” differences.
What exactly amounts to a “non- essential” difference is open to debate
(see Bartha, 2016). In this paper, I shall interpret it quite broadly as
meaning that the elements of comparison should have some key prop-
erties in common, such as a common pattern of behaviour or of inter-
action. Let me illustrate this point in relation to Lietaer's analogical
argument. How much do natural and monetary ecosystems have in
common?
Prima facie, it is hard to see what currencies and natural elements
have in common. Currencies are social constructs, which depend on
what people do with them and think of them (Searle, 1995). Their
existence relies on their acceptance by a large number of users (Tobin,
2008). Moreover, contrary to nature, these social constructs are rela-
tively recent and have not undergone any severe natural selection
processes (Haldane and May, 2011). Currencies are protected by gov-
ernments, which can force people to use them.
Nevertheless, Lietaer and his co-authors introduce two possible key
common properties that may be shared by money and natural elements
alike. They argue that natural and monetary ecosystems are both
complex systems and that their aim is to provide certain functions. For
instance, they write that “viewing economies as flow systems empha-
sizes directly money's primary function as medium of exchange. In this
view, money is to the real economy like blood is to your body: it is an
essential vehicle for catalyzing processes, allocating resources, and
generally allowing the exchange system to work as a synergetic whole.”
(Lietaer et al., 2009, p. 9).
Money does have several functions (Tobin, 2008). Similarly, eco-
systems render multiple services to humans, from gas and climate
regulation to waste treatment and food production (Costanza et al.,
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1998; De Groot et al., 2002). However, one can doubt that this is an
adequate way to compare natural and monetary ecosystems. While it is
undeniable that money is used and created in order to provide certain
functions, one cannot argue with the same ease that the purpose of
nature is to render these ecosystem services. Contrary to monetary
ecosystems, it is much more controversial to contend that natural
ecosystems have been “designed” or “created” for these purposes. The
thesis that nature has a purpose (or a design) has been forcefully con-
tested since at least Darwin's revolutionary work (Kitcher, 2009).
Therefore, natural and monetary ecosystems do share some key
properties: they are both complex systems. However, there is at least
one key difference between natural and monetary ecosystems. Natural
ecosystems react to shocks without any intent. The order of nature is
spontaneous and not designed. On the contrary, when a shock hits a
monetary system, multiple actors will coordinate to find the adequate
response to it. Economic actors do exhibit some instinctive or emotional
reactions to shocks, especially in the financial sphere (Shiller, 2012).
However, the reactions of private banks, central banks and government
bodies cannot be described as purely instinctive, as there are also the
result of complex coordination processes (Elster, 2007).
This latter point has serious implications for my argument. If taken
seriously, Lietaer's proposal appears to rely on the belief in spontaneous
(monetary) order, a concept that was first forged by von Hayek (1945),
whose influence is acknowledged by Lietaer (e.g. Lietaer et al., 2009, p.
13). An Ecology of money would in practice involve a great number of
different currencies. Each of them would be linked to a community, a
private firm, a state, or an informal group of individuals. Lietaer claims
that the result of their interaction would be harmonious and stable.
Harmonious because all currencies will “fit together” so that the
monetary system will reach equilibrium without central intervention.
Stable because the system will be able to react resiliently to external
shocks. As we have seen, in times of crisis, reliable currencies will
“spontaneously” replace “failed” ones.
Of course, there are several important differences between von
Hayek's and Lietaer's proposals. von Hayek (1990) proposed to get rid
of all banking regulations, whereas Lietaer argues against deregulation
(Lietaer et al., 2012, pp. 45–48). von Hayek is reliant on the capacity of
competition to produce an efficient outcome, while Lietaer leaves space
for the state and other central agencies to play the role of regulators.
Nevertheless, Lietaer is extremely unclear concerning how an Ecology
of money would work in practice. Nothing is said on how different
currencies would interact, whether they would be convertible into one
another, and how the hierarchy between international, national, re-
gional and local currencies would work.
Thus, will Lietaer's scheme (or Douthwaite's) be able to reach sta-
bility? At first sight, a system made of multiple different kinds of cur-
rencies circulating in parallel to each other may seem very complex to
manage. Lietaer's scheme raises numerous unanswered questions. How
would exchange rates be fixed? Will all currencies be convertible into
each other? Who will make sure that monetary creation will neither be
too abundant nor too restrictive, in a system with potentially hundreds
of parallel currencies? What may guarantee that agents will not hoard
certain currencies (the “good” ones), and spend others (the “bad” ones),
thus producing unintentionally the worse consequences of Gresham's
Law? Lietaer and his co-authors offer no answers to these questions.
Having a look at past experiments of monetary plurality may be
helpful here. As Fantacci (2005), Kuroda (2008) and others have
pointed out, the past centuries are filled with examples of successful
cohabitation between different currencies. Free banking, as experienced
in Scotland or the English colonies, may also provide an interesting
example (White, 1984). However, the episodes of monetary plurality
studied by Fantacci and Kuroda may be difficult to compare with Lie-
taer's proposal. First, because Lietaer is not at all clear on what his
proposal would look like, and, second, because these experiments often
involved currencies that no longer exist and that have not much in
common with complementary currencies. Concerning Free banking,
historians and economists have raised serious doubts regarding its ef-
ficiency and alleged success, with opinions ranging from serious con-
cerns (Bordo and Schwartz, 1995) to quick dismissal (Rothbard, 1988).
The existence of these past experiments does show that monetary
plurality is possible. However, no conclusive answer regarding the
potential success of Lietaer's scheme can be drawn from these past
episodes.
To sum up, we can have serious doubts about the capacity of the
analogical argument to support the Ecology of money proposal. First,
and contrary to what Lietaer and his co-authors argue, the WIR example
(despite its inherent qualities) does not provide an empirical con-
firmation of their theory. Second, Lietaer's arguments and mainstream
studies in ecology do not make use of the same concepts, which hinders
any meaningful comparison. Third, the causal mechanism underlying
the analogical argument is only one among many possible explaining
factors of ecosystems' stability. Fourth, Lietaer assumes that monetary
and natural ecosystems are comparable, which may be open to doubts.
Finally, there is no evidence that monetary plurality, as conceived by
Lietaer, will give birth to a stable monetary system.
2.3. Normative Limitations
The analogical argument suffers from a second range of problems.
Lietaer and his co-authors do not make sufficiently explicit the moral
principles on which their proposal is relying. Nor do they confront their
arguments to possible objections relating to what it would entail.
The first problem concerns the concept of resilience. As Brand and
Jax (2007) show, it is possible to find several meanings for this term in
Ecological economics. Moreover, depending on its definition and on its
use, this concept can have both a descriptive and a normative inter-
pretation (Brand and Jax, 2007; Strunz, 2012). Originally, the resilience
of natural ecosystems was considered to be a purely descriptive concept
(Holling, 1973) and many authors in Ecological economics still define it
in a strictly descriptive way (Derissen et al., 2011). However, the
concept has increasingly been interpreted in a more normative way,
especially in socio-ecological studies (e.g. Walker et al., 2004). Lietaer's
work is clearly part of this latter tendency (Lietaer repeatedly cites
Walker et al. (2004) as a source of inspiration).
Recall that, for Lietaer et al. (2012, p. 78), resilience “measures the
ability of a system to recover from a disturbance”. This definition has a
clear descriptive content, which was the object of the previous sections.
However, Lietaer's use of resilience, especially in the context of
monetary systems, raises many normative questions. In that specific
context at least, one may be right to wonder whether any sort of re-
silient response to a monetary or economic shock is desirable. First, the
shock itself might be welcome. Just think about popular revolts against
tyranny, or against plutocracy. Second, all resilient responses are not
desirable. For instance, can a response that causes harm count as re-
silient? Strictly speaking, austerity measures constitute a resilient reply
to financial meltdowns: it may help bringing the system back to equi-
librium. Almost everyone would agree that a financial meltdown is a
detrimental shock but generally disagrees about the most effective or
just response to it. Third, a resilient response to a shock might drive the
economy towards a new equilibrium, which may not be as desirable as
the initial one. In the case of a financial crisis, the nature of the post-
crisis equilibrium depends greatly on the government's response: whe-
ther it chooses austerity measures or a Keynesian economic boost will
make a great difference. In short, we can say that the concept of resi-
lience has an important normative side: we need to know to what
shocks we ought to respond and what an adequate or just or efficient
response would be. Unfortunately, Lietaer and his co-authors do not
provide a clear answer to these questions.
The second issue concerns the nature of stability. Is stability in-
herently desirable? Lietaer's theory does not make sufficiently explicit
what kinds of economic or monetary system one ought to keep stable. It
points at the stability of a system, regardless of the desirability of that
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system. In a way, the present monetary system is rather resistant to
shocks: the dollar system is still in place in the US after several im-
portant financial crises, wars and policy changes. I doubt Lietaer would
find this desirable. What he desires is a just and sustainable economic
system, not a system that perpetuates injustice and environmental
harm. Let's imagine that complementary currencies would contribute to
maintain an unjust economic system, would this be a desirable out-
come? We would need some normative criteria to determine what we
ought to keep stable, and why we ought to keep it stable. Stability is one
important value: relentless shocks, booms and recessions should be
avoided, as far as possible. However, this is not enough. We need other
values to evaluate our economic system. One would need to know, for
instance, whether this system guarantees basic human rights, or whe-
ther it achieves some kind of distributive equality. Unfortunately, this
discussion is absent from Lietaer's account, which largely ignores cur-
rent debates on (normative) theories of sustainability and inter-
generational justice.
3. The Growth Imperative
Douthwaite, as well as Lietaer and his co-authors, offer a second
argument in defence of monetary plurality. In short, they claim that it
could undermine the growth imperative that plagues our economies.
This section first presents their argument in detail. Second, it examines
whether our economies really suffer from a monetary growth im-
perative. Finally, assuming that it does, it studies whether Lietaer and
Douthwaite's proposals would effectively counter that growth im-
perative.
3.1. Presentation of the Argument
Both Lietaer and Douthwaite argue that one of the root causes of the
unsustainability of the present monetary system concerns the way
money is presently created (Douthwaite, 2000; Lietaer et al., 2010).
Nowadays, private banks create money each time they make loans, as
new loans translate into new deposits (McLeay et al., 2014). This pro-
cess has several checks. Prudential regulations usually restrict the kinds
of loans that banks can make (Dietsch et al., 2018). Central banks can
indirectly control the amount of money created by private banks
through monetary policy, most notably by setting reserves require-
ments and the interest rate paid on these reserves (Goodhart et al.,
2014). According to Lietaer and Douthwaite, these checks are in-
sufficient and money creation by banks in the form of loans still creates
a “growth imperative”, which inherently plagues our current monetary
system. Credit requires debtors to repay their debt with interest, and,
therefore, it forces people to constantly increase production in order to
repay a debt that is permanently growing (see also Farley et al., 2013;
Kuzminski, 2013; Loehr, 2012). Because this growth imperative is in
contradiction with the finite nature of the resources of our planet, the
present monetary system is, according to these authors, unsustainable.
Lietaer and Douthwaite do not argue for the immediate ban of bank
money. Rather, they contend that their project of implementing an
Ecology of money could reach this goal gradually, by slowly reducing
the need for bank money. That project would involve a myriad of
parallel currencies, from local currencies and regional currencies to
Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS), barter systems such as the
WIR, and large-scale government sponsored projects such as the NU in
the Netherlands or the Torekes in Belgium. Despite their disparities,
what these currencies have in common is that they do not require their
users to indefinitely produce more, invest more and borrow more
money (Lietaer et al., 2012, pp. 139–184). In short, they are not subject
to a growth imperative. LETS and local currencies, for instance, rely on
a charter that explicitly ban loans with interests (Blanc and Fare, 2016).
Therefore, if an Ecology of money is implemented, more and more
payments and investments would no longer depend on conventional
bank money, and the imperative to grow would weaken.
In addition, Douthwaite also advocates the creation of a single
“energy-backed” currency, whose creation would be limited according
to the availability of CO2 emission rights (Douthwaite, 2000, 2012).
Similarly to a gold standard, the amount of money in circulation would
be directly linked to the availability of a given resource (here “CO2”,
not gold). Every other currency would be tied to that currency, thanks
to appropriate exchange rate mechanisms. The existence of such a
currency would, according to Douthwaite, restrict money creation and,
mechanically, also limit economic growth. However, Douthwaite does
not explain how the “energy-backed currency” proposal would allow to
achieve sustainability and he offers no articulate theory in support of
his claims. Why would growth be “mechanically” limited if money was
tied to CO2 emissions? After all, for more than a century, the gold
standard allowed capitalism to flourish in a way that was very detri-
mental to nature (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 21–32). Why would an “energy-
standard” limit growth, if the gold standard could not? A related,
though different, objection to Douthwaite's claim concerns what some
authors have called the “Chicago Plan”. Several economists (most no-
tably, I. Fisher (1935)) have proposed to limit money creation drasti-
cally (for a contemporary treatment, see Benes and Kumhof, 2012).
Contrary to Douthwaite, however, they argue that it would lead to
economic growth (not de-growth), while making the economic system
less prone to crisis. Douthwaite, therefore, owes us an explanation of
how his proposal, while restricting money creation, would also restrict
growth. Unfortunately, so far, the explanation is lacking. For all these
reasons, I will not study this latter proposal in detail here (for a deeper
look, see Collins et al., 2013) and rather focus on what Douthwaite and
Lietaer have in common.
3.2. Is there a Growth Imperative?
Several studies have recently examined the claim that a monetary
growth imperative necessarily pushes our economies towards indefinite
economic growth (Berg et al., 2015; Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie, 2016;
Jackson and Victor, 2015; Richters and Siemoneit, 2017, 2019; Strunz
et al., 2017). Richters and Siemoneit (2019) help clarify the debate by
making a distinction between a mere driver of growth and a real growth
imperative. They define the latter as “exterior conditions that make it
necessary for an agent (such as an individual, firm, or state) to increase
their economic efforts as to avoid existential consequences” (Richters
and Siemoneit, 2019, p. 129). In the case of a monetary growth im-
perative, for instance, “exterior conditions” refer to the requirement to
repay one's debts with interest and “existential consequences” relate to
the fact that failing to repay one's debt would lead to bankruptcy for
firms and severe economic loss for individuals. Are interest-bearing
loans creating such an imperative to grow? Several authors have argued
that the growth imperative argument was suffering from several im-
portant issues.
First, one should never forget that the power of banks to create
money is restricted by competition and profitability, as well as by nu-
merous regulations (Goodhart et al., 2014; Strunz et al., 2017). Banks
cannot and have no interest in creating large amounts of debts in-
definitely, as competition will tend to push down interest rates on new
loans, hence affecting their profitability. Therefore, even if regulations
and competitive pressure do not rule out the possibility of a growth
imperative, they nevertheless put some limits to money creation.
Second, as Richters and Siemoneit (2017) have shown, the propo-
nents of the monetary growth imperative model neglect that creditors
could consume or invest their interest income, so that money flows back
into the economy and no growth imperative is induced. Only if cred-
itors wish to hoard their monetary holdings indefinitely can a growth
imperative occur. So, as Richters and Siemoneit (2017) argue, growth is
not “structurally inevitable” but primarily a product of the choices of
many individuals. This point may be put in simple terms, as follows.
When explaining the growth imperative, Lietaer generally takes the
following example (Lietaer et al., 2012, chap. 5): a foreigner proposes
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to lend money to villagers, but asks them to repay it with interest at the
end of the year. Accepting that offer allows villagers to produce more,
but also generates an obligation to grow, in order to repay the debt. Let
me now modify slightly Lietaer's example and assume that the money
lender is not a foreigner but a member of the community. If that person
consumed all his revenue, for instance by buying the villagers' goods,
money would flow back to them, so that they could repay their loans
without being required to produce more.
Third, and most importantly, several Post-Keynesian authors have
argued for the possibility of a stationary state with a positive interest
rate (Berg et al., 2015; Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie, 2016; Jackson and
Victor, 2015). For Post-Keynesians, money creation is an endogenous
process. As Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie (2016, pp. 164–165) put it:
“Money is created through bank credit when economic agents have a
credit-worthy demand for it.” In other words, this means that “the rise
in production takes shape in the mind of producers before money is
created and is effectively realized when credit is granted and money is
created to finance it.” The growth in production drives the growth of
the money supply. For Post-Keynesians, the money supply can in no
way be held responsible for the growth of output, which entails that
there cannot be a money-led growth imperative.
3.3. Can an Ecology of Money Get Rid of the Growth Imperative?
These three problems raise doubts about the claim that there is a
monetary growth imperative. Note, however, that the two first pro-
blems do not completely rule out the growth imperative, and that Post-
Keynesian theory is not uncontroversial. Clearly, Lietaer and
Douthwaite, as well as many orthodox economists, have contrasting
views on the matter. Disentangling the debates between these different
schools of thought is well beyond the reach of this article, though. Let
us assume, then, for the sake of the argument, that a growth imperative
does pose a threat to the sustainability of the monetary and ecological
systems. Could a monetary system made of a plurality of currencies get
rid of the growth imperative?
According to Lietaer and Douthwaite, the key mechanism behind
the monetary growth imperative is the current money creation process.
As we have seen, they argue that money creation by banks in the form
of loans triggers a growth imperative. Neither authors argue for the
immediate ban of bank money, though. Rather, they argue that the
growth imperative can be tamed if people, corporations and states start
to use complementary currencies on a large scale. In effect, they call for
the slow replacement of bank money by interest-free complementary
currencies, immune of any growth imperative. Consequently, the cen-
tral challenge for them is to make sure that people will effectively adopt
such currencies and accept to use them.
Up to now, complementary currencies have had a relatively low
success in attracting users, despite the fact that there are very few legal
barriers to their implementations and wider use (Attout et al., 2013).
Moreover, the financial crisis could have opened a new era for these
currencies, as mainstream banks and financial markets were contested
and blamed for their reckless behaviour (Turner, 2016). However, no
significant surge in adoption was acknowledged at the time (Blanc,
2018). One explanation might be that the power of routine is very
strong, so that people keep using a currency simply because they are
used to using it (Aglietta and Orléan, 2002). Money has a special fea-
ture: it only makes sense to use it if it is accepted by a sufficiently large
number of people (Tobin, 2008). This entails that currencies that are
already circulating on a large scale benefit from network effects while
smaller currencies may struggle to grow. The power of habit and the
inconvenience of change may discourage people to turn to a new cur-
rency. Alternatively, we could think that these currencies do not pro-
vide enough incentives for their adoption. Their advantages are mainly
potential, and there are no signs of any real significant impacts of these
currencies on the environment or the economy (Dittmer, 2013;
Marshall and O'Neill, 2018; Michel and Hudon, 2015). On the contrary,
bank money has a huge advantage, at least for a significant portion of
economic agents: it gives creditors the power to earn money simply by
lending it. Why would they wish to relinquish that privilege? Debtors
might consider that complementary currencies could be at their ad-
vantage, though. However, no surge in adoption that could reflect that
reasoning has yet been acknowledged. A possible explanation of that
fact is that participating in such schemes can entail a certain number of
costs that might discourage many potential users. First, the cost of
dedicating time and commitment as a participant in these schemes
should not be underestimated (Aldridge and Patterson, 2002), and is
among the main reasons for the failure of several complementary cur-
rencies to attract a large audience (Blanc, 2018). One should also
mention the transaction costs of dealing with multiple different cur-
rencies at the same time, which possibly means multiple bank accounts,
means of payments, and accounting mechanisms.
The problem is that the Ecology of money proposal cannot fulfil its
objectives if it is not widely accepted and implemented. Indeed, for a
currency to have any effect on the economy, a sufficiently large number
of people and institutions (banks, states) should use it. Currently,
however, neither the economic context nor the potential benefits of
Lietaer's proposal seem sufficient to trigger the spontaneous and free
adoption of Lietaer's proposal by a large variety of individuals and
firms. Lietaer and his co-authors (2009) argue that states could accept
alternative currencies in partial payment of taxes, so as to incentivize
people to use them. However, that horizon is, for now, out of sight.
4. Conclusion
Douthwaite and Lietaer argue that a monetary system constituted of
a large array of alternative complementary currencies would be more
resilient and less prone to crisis than the present monetary system. They
also argue that it could help defeat the growth imperative that, ac-
cording to them, plagues our economies.
Regarding the first argument, I showed that neither Lietaer nor
Douthwaite are able to provide clear and precise definitions of resi-
lience, efficiency and stability. Moreover, their definitions often differ
from mainstream notions in ecology. I also argued that the analogy
between natural and monetary ecosystems was unlikely to hold. First,
there is presently no empirical evidence supporting that analogy.
Second, the concepts and causal mechanisms at the heart of the di-
versity-stability relationship in scientific ecology differ starkly from
those of Lietaer's theory. Third, Lietaer assumes that monetary and
natural ecosystems are comparable, which may be open to doubts.
Fourth, the Ecology of money tends to rely on overconfidence in the
spontaneous capacity of a plural and diverse monetary system to reach
a stable equilibrium without any significant interventions by the state. I
have argued, however, that there is no evidence that monetary plur-
ality, as conceived by Lietaer, will give birth to a stable monetary
system. Finally, the analogical argument fails to provide sufficient
normative reasons to favour an Ecology of money.
Regarding the second argument, several theorists have raised ser-
ious doubts regarding the existence of a monetary growth imperative.
However, even if we assume that there is such an imperative, the re-
latively low success of complementary currencies in attracting new
members entails that the Ecology of money proposal is very unlikely to
effectively curb growth. People seem reluctant to use multiple curren-
cies in parallel to each other, for various possible reasons. Therefore, we
can doubt that monetary plurality will be implemented in the near
future, and that it will be able to challenge any credit-driven growth
imperative, or to foster the stability and resilience of our monetary
system.
The doubts raised about Lietaer's and Douthwaite's proposals do not
entail that we should give up the struggle for a just financial system, nor
that monetary plurality is necessarily ruled out as a desirable alter-
native to our monetary system. This article is not a defence of the status
quo. Our present monetary system is far from perfect, as the recent
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financial and sovereign debt crises have shown (Turner, 2016). Further
research is needed, however, to inquire how complementary currencies
or other monetary reforms could contribute to making our financial
system more just, less unstable and more harmoniously imbedded into
our social and natural environment.
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